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and the Nash equilibrium in the choice of policy instrument is shown to depend on the
interest elasticity of money demand.
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The problem of the optimal choice of the monetary policy instrument has been a topic of
active economic research for at least three decades now. In 1970 William Poole published
a seminal paper in which he showed that alternative policy instruments (i.e. the nominal
interest rate vs. the money supply) produce diﬀerent outcomes depending on the source
of the shocks (e.g. money demand shock vs. real shocks). Poole assumed that the central
bank cannot make its instrument contingent on the exogenous shocks. This result appears
today in standard undergraduate monetary-economics textbooks.
Not long after Pooles contribution, the economic profession started too look with in-
terest at the problem of monetary policy in an interdependent world. The desirability
of international cooperation in monetary policy became a hot topic in monetary theory.
In particular Turnovsky and dOrey (1986) re-addressed Pooles question in a two-country
model where the central bank has to choose the optimal instrument in a strategic envi-
ronment. Turnovsky and dOrey, like Poole, assumed that the central banks must decide
on a “ﬁxed” interest rate or on a “ﬁxed” money supply.
More recently, the monetary open-economy literature has reconsidered a number of
“old” issues under a new light. In particular the new open-economy macroeconomics
derives the constituent elements of the models from ﬁrst principles: as consistently as
possible with microeconomic theory. On the other hand, researchers in this area have tried
to envisage and model more sophisticated “rules” for policy makers than simple interest
rate pegs or ﬁxed money supply schedules. In particular, most monetary macroeconomic
models display “feedback” rules for the monetary policy instrument. Furthermore, many of
the normative exercises that appear in today’s literature are utility-based: the preferences
of the economic agents are taken as the objective of the policy makers. This new set of
assumptions has consequences for the optimal choice of the monetary instrument. For
example, in a closed economy a welfare-maximizing central bank that can set the policy
instrument contingent on the shocks would, in general, be indiﬀerent between setting the
interest rate and setting its money supply. In other words, as long as a money demand
schedule links the interest rate to the money supply, and as long as all the shocks are
observable, the central bank can work out the appropriate supply of money that supports
the desired interest rate by simply inverting the money demand equation. Less obvious is
whether the instrument choice problem survives under these new assumptions in an open-
economy model with policy interdependence. Our paper tries to address this question.
A number of papers in the new open-economy literature has modelled the monetary
policy problem as a problem of choosing the optimal parameters of an instrument rule
that explicitly reacts to the fundamental exogenous shocks. Some papers have assumed
that the policy instrument is the nominal interest rate, while others have assumed that
the instrument is the money supply. None, so far, seem to have acknowledged the fact
that, even under the new set of assumptions that characterize the new open-economy
literature, the cross-country policy interdependence will aﬀect the relative optimality of
the two instruments. In contrast, we show that the two instruments can, in general,
achieve diﬀerent levels of welfare depending on the sensitivity of the demand for money to
the marginal utility of consumption. We do this in a model that closely reﬂects the salientfeatures of the new open-economy literature.
More precisely, we develop a symmetric two-country model with monopolistic com-
petition, one-period predetermined prices, partial pass-through of the exchange rate and
welfare-maximizing central banks. Under these assumptions, and when the money demand
is very sensitive to the marginal utility of consumption, the non-cooperative monetary
policy produces a larger welfare under a money supply rule than under an interest rate
rule. The opposite is true when the money demand schedule is not very sensitive to the
marginal utility of consumption. The rationale behind these results is that the position
of the money demand schedule, in a money market diagram, depends on the monetary
policy pursued by the foreign country via the aggregate price level: directly and, with the
opposite sign, indirectly through the inﬂation eﬀect on domestic aggregate consumption.
Therefore, choosing the money supply as policy instrument opens up a further channel for
policy interaction.
We point out that there are a number of special cases in which the two instruments
can yield the same equilibrium and, hence, the same level of welfare. One has already
been mentioned above and concerns the sensitivity of the money demand with respect to
the marginal utility of consumption. When the demand for real balances moves one-to-
one with the marginal utility of consumption the direct and indirect eﬀect of the foreign
monetary policy on the domestic money demand cancel out exactly. As a consequence the
domestic money demand schedule does not respond to the foreign monetary policy and
the domestic interest rate is simply proportional to the domestic money supply.
A second important case amounts to the “zero pass through” of the exchange rate.
In this case the aggregate price level is ﬁxed in each period so that, again, the foreign
monetary authority cannot aﬀect the domestic demand schedule.
A third case in which the instrument choice problem would not arise consists of the “full
pass through” of the exchange rate. In this case, and provided that the relative demand
for domestic and imported goods is unit-elastic, consumption is identical across countries.
This implies that there is no conﬂict of interests between the two central banks. Indeed,
in this case the non-cooperative outcome coincides with the cooperative equilibrium. We
show that the real allocation that is brought about by an interest rate rule is simply
proportional to the real allocation that the interest rate can bring about under a money
supply rule. Hence, either allocation is achievable by a mere proportional adjustment of
the instrument.
The latter case is not a general result. We argue that under a non-unit-elastic demand
for imported goods and full pass through, consumption in the two countries will not be
identical and will depend on the terms of trade. Therefore, the central banks have an
incentive to aﬀect the terms of trade to their favour, with the consequence that the non-
cooperative equilibrium will diﬀer from the cooperative equilibrium. Also in this case the
level of welfare that can be achieved under an interest rate rule diﬀers from the level that
can be achieved under the money supply rule, provided that the domestic money demand
schedule is sensitive to the foreign monetary policy.
Our paper also shows that the policy instrument that yields the highest level of welfare
- when chosen by both central banks - would be chosen endogenously as a result of a non-
cooperative game between the banks. That is to say, the symmetric choice of the interestrate is a Nash equilibrium whenever the demand schedule is inelastic with respect to
the marginal utility of consumption, while the symmetric choice of the money supply
instrument is the Nash equilibrium when the money demand is suﬃciently elastic to the
marginal utility of consumption.
In quantitative welfare terms, the diﬀerence between the various combinations of
choices of instrument depends on the precise speciﬁcation of the model. The simple bench-
mark model that we present in the paper yields only negligible diﬀerences. Nevertheless,
we note that alternative speciﬁcations can produce larger welfare diﬀerences. Therefore,
while our paper should be seen primarily as a theoretical contribution, its implications
could have practical relevance.Zusammenfassung
Mit dem Problem der optimalen Wahl des geldpolitischen Instruments befasst sich die
Wirtschaftsforschung bereits seit mindestens drei Jahrzehnten intensiv. Im Jahr 1970
ver¨ oﬀentlichte William Poole ein Forschungspapier, in dem er nachwies, dass unterschied-
liche geldpolitische Instrumente (d. h. Nominalzins versus Geldmenge) unterschiedliche
Ergebnisse hervorbringen, je nachdem, auf welche Ursache die Schocks zur¨ uckzuf¨ uhren
sind (Geldnachfrageschock oder reale Schocks). Poole ging von der Annahme aus, dass
die Zentralbank ihr Instrument nicht von exogenen Schocks abh¨ angig machen kann. Diese
Erkenntnis ist inzwischen in alle einschl¨ agigen Einf¨ uhrungslehrb¨ ucher ¨ uber die monet¨ are
¨ Okonomie eingeﬂossen.
Nicht lange nach Pooles Beitrag begannen die ¨ Okonomen, sich verst¨ arkt mit dem Pro-
blem der Geldpolitik in einer interdependenten Welt auseinanderzusetzen. Die Forderung
nach internationaler Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der Geldpolitik wurde zu einem
viel diskutierten Thema innerhalb der Geldtheorie. Insbesondere Turnovsky und D’Orey
(1986) wandten sich im Rahmen eines Zweil¨ andermodells, in dem die Zentralbank in einem
strategischen Umfeld das optimale geldpolitische Instrument ausw¨ ahlen muss, erneut Poo-
les Fragestellung zu. Wie zuvor Poole, gingen auch Turnovsky und D’Orey davon aus, dass
sich die Zentralbanken zwischen einem ”festen“ Zinssatz und einer ”festen“ Geldmenge
entscheiden m¨ ussen.
In j¨ ungster Zeit hat sich die Literatur zur Geldtheorie in einer oﬀenen Volkswirtschaft
mit ver¨ andertem Blickwinkel einiger ”alter“ Themen wieder angenommen. Vor allem in
der neuen Makro¨ okonomie der oﬀenen Volkswirtschaft werden die Modellelemente von er-
sten Grund-s¨ atzen abgeleitet: d.h. so konsistent wie m¨ oglich mit der mikro¨ okonomischen
Theorie zu sein. Andererseits haben auf diesem Gebiet t¨ atige Forscher versucht, den f¨ ur die
Geldpolitik Verantwortlichen komplexere ”Regeln“ als die einfache Anbindung an einen
Zinssatz oder ein festes Geldmengenziel an die Hand zu geben und zu modellieren. Die
meisten monet¨ aren makro¨ okonomischen Modelle weisen insbesondere ”Feedback-Regeln“
f¨ ur das geldpolitische Instrument auf. Viele der in der heutigen Literatur erscheinenden
normativen Verfahren sind dar¨ uber hinaus nutzenorientiert: Die Pr¨ aferenzen der Wirt-
schaftsteilnehmer werden als Ziel der Geldpolitik verwendet. Diese neuen Annahmen blei-
ben nicht ohne Folgen f¨ ur die optimale Wahl des geldpolitischen Instruments. In einer
geschlossenen Volkswirtschaft zum Beispiel w¨ are es einer wohlstandsmaximierenden Zen-
tralbank, die das geldpolitische Instrument abh¨ angig von den Schocks einsetzen kann, im
Allgemeinen gleichg¨ ultig, ob sie den Zinssatz oder die Geldmenge festsetzt. Mit anderen
Worten, solange die Geldnachfrage den Zinssatz mit der Geldmenge verbindet und alle
Schocks beobachtbar sind, kann die Zentralbank die angemessene, den gew¨ unschten Zins-
satz unterst¨ utzende Geldmenge ermitteln, indem sie die Geldnachfragegleichung einfach
umkehrt. Nicht so eindeutig l¨ asst sich sagen, ob das Problem der Instrumentenwahl im
Lichte dieser neuen Annahmen in einem Modell mit oﬀener Volkswirtschaft und geldpoliti-
scher Interdependenz weiter Bestand hat. Im vorliegenden Beitrag gehen wir dieser Frage
nach.
In mehreren Aufs¨ atzen der neueren Literatur ¨ uber oﬀene Volkswirtschaften wird das
Problem der Geldpolitik als Schwierigkeit dargestellt, die optimalen Parameter f¨ ur eineInstrumenten-regel auszuw¨ ahlen, die explizit auf die fundamentalen exogenen Schocks rea-
giert. Einige Beitr¨ age gingen vom nominalen Zinssatz als geldpolitischem Instrument aus,
andere von der Geldmenge. Keine dieser Arbeiten tr¨ agt aber der Tatsache Rechnung, dass
die l¨ ander¨ ubergreifende Interdependenz der Geldpolitik - selbst unter Ber¨ ucksichtigung
der neuen Annahmen in der einschl¨ agigen Literatur zur oﬀenen Volkswirtschaft - die rela-
tive Optimalit¨ at dieser beiden Instrumente beeinﬂusst. Wir werden dagegen zeigen, dass
die beiden Instrumente im Allgemeinen ein unterschiedliches Wohlfahrtsniveau erzielen
k¨ onnen, je nachdem, wie stark die Geldnachfrage auf den Grenznutzen des Konsums rea-
giert. Zu diesem Zweck verwenden wir ein Modell, das die Grundz¨ uge der neuen Literatur
zur oﬀenen Volkswirtschaft genau abbildet.
Im Einzelnen entwickeln wir ein symmetrisches Zweil¨ andermodell mit einem monopo-
listischen Wettbewerb, im Voraus festgelegten Preisen f¨ ur einen deﬁnierten Zeitraum, ei-
nem teilweisen Einﬂuss der Wechselkursbewegungen auf das Preisniveau und wohlstands-
maximierenden Zentralbanken. Unter diesen Annahmen und wenn die Geldnachfrage sehr
stark auf den Grenznutzen des Konsums reagiert, f¨ uhrt die nichtkooperative Geldpolitik
bei Anwendung einer Geldmengenregel zu gr¨ oerem Wohlstand als bei einer Zinsregel. Das
Gegenteil triﬀt zu, wenn die Geldnachfragekurve nicht sehr stark auf den Grenznutzen des
Konsums reagiert. Diese Ergebnisse sind darauf zur¨ uckzuf¨ uhren, dass in einem Geldmarkt-
diagramm die Position der Geldnachfragekurve ¨ uber das gesamtwirtschaftliche Preisniveau
von der Geldpolitik des anderen Landes abh¨ angt: direkt bzw. - mit umgekehrtem Vorzei-
chen - indirekt durch den Inﬂationseﬀekt auf die gesamte inl¨ andische Konsumnachfrage.
Daher er¨ oﬀnet die Verwendung der Geldmenge als Instrument der Geldpolitik zus¨ atzliche
Wege der geldpolitischen Interaktion.
Wir legen ferner dar, dass es eine Reihe von Sonderf¨ allen gibt, in denen die bei-
den Instrumente dasselbe Gleichgewicht und somit das gleiche Wohlstandsniveau ergeben
k¨ onnen. Einer dieser F¨ alle wurde bereits erw¨ ahnt und bezieht sich auf die Sensitivit¨ at
der Geldnachfrage in Bezug auf den Grenznutzen des Konsums. Wenn sich die Nachfrage
nach Realkasse im Verh¨ altnis eins zu eins mit dem Grenznutzen des Konsums bewegt,
gleichen sich der direkte und der indirekte Eﬀekt der ausl¨ andischen Geldpolitik auf die
inl¨ andische Geldnachfrage genau aus. Infolgedessen reagiert die inl¨ andische Geldnachfra-
ge nicht auf die ausl¨ andische Geldpolitik, und der inl¨ andische Zinssatz verh¨ alt sich ganz
einfach proportional zur inl¨ andischen Geldmenge.
Ein zweiter wichtiger Fall ist der, dass Wechselkursbewegungen vollst¨ andig ohne Wir-
kung auf die Preisentwicklung bleiben. Hier ist das gesamtwirtschaftliche Preisniveau f¨ ur
jeden Zeitraum festgelegt, sodass die ausl¨ andischen geldpolitischen Instanzen die Entwick-
lung der inl¨ andischen Nachfrage abermals nicht beeinﬂussen k¨ onnen.
Ein dritter Fall, in dem sich das Problem der Instrumentenwahl nicht stellt, ist gegeben,
wenn Wechselkursbewegungen voll auf die Preise durchschlagen. Dabei ist der Verbrauch
in beiden L¨ andern identisch, vorausgesetzt, dass die relative Nachfrage nach heimischen
und importierten G¨ utern einheitselastisch ist. Dies bedeutet, dass es zu keinem Interessens-
konﬂikt zwischen den beiden Zentralbanken kommt. In diesem Fall stimmt das nichtko-
operative Ergebnis sogar mit dem kooperativen Gleichgewicht ¨ uberein. Wir zeigen, dass
sich die reale Allokation durch eine Zinsregel proportional zur realen Allokation, die der
Zinssatz bei Anwendung einer Geldmengenregel bewirken kann, verh¨ alt. Die Allokationwird also in beiden F¨ allen durch eine einfache proportionale Anpassung des Instruments
erreicht.
Im letztgenannten Fall handelt es sich nicht um ein allgemeing¨ ultiges Ergebnis. Wir
legen dar, dass der Konsum bei einer nicht-einheitselastischen Nachfrage nach importier-
ten G¨ utern und bei Wechselkursbewegungen, die vollst¨ andig auf die Preise durchschlagen,
in den beiden L¨ andern nicht identisch ist und von den Terms of Trade abh¨ angt. Daher
haben die Zentralbanken ein Interesse daran, die Terms of Trade zu ihren Gunsten zu be-
einﬂussen, mit dem Ergebnis, dass das nichtkooperative Gleichgewicht vom kooperativen
Gleichgewicht abweicht. Auch unterscheidet sich das Wohlstandsniveau, das bei einer Zins-
regel erzielt werden kann, von dem Niveau, das eine Geldmengenregel erm¨ oglicht, sofern
die inl¨ andische Geldnachfrage auf die ausl¨ andische Geldpolitik reagiert.
Wir zeigen in unserem Beitrag ferner, dass es sich bei der Wahl des geldpolitischen
Instruments, welches das h¨ ochste Wohlstandsniveau gew¨ ahrleistet (wenn beide Zentral-
banken das gleiche Instrument w¨ ahlen), um eine endogene Wahl handeln w¨ urde, die das
Ergebnis eines nichtkooperativen Spiels zwischen den Banken w¨ are. Dies bedeutet, dass die
symmetrische Wahl des Zinssatzes immer dann ein Nash-Gleichgewicht ist, wenn die Nach-
frage in Bezug auf den Grenznutzen des Konsums unelastisch ist. Die symmetrische Wahl
des Geldmengeninstruments dagegen entspricht immer dann einem Nash-Gleichgewicht,
wenn die Geldnachfrage hinreichend elastisch zum Grenznutzen des Konsums ist.
Was den Wohlstand in quantitativer Hinsicht betriﬀt, so h¨ angt die Diﬀerenz zwischen
den verschiedenen Kombinationen der zur Wahl stehenden Instrumente von der genauen
Speziﬁkation des Modells ab. Das einfache Benchmark-Modell, das wir in diesem Beitrag
verwenden, impliziert nur geringf¨ ugige Diﬀerenzen. Wir stellen aber fest, dass andere Spe-
ziﬁkationen zu gr¨ oeren Wohlstandsunterschieden f¨ uhren k¨ onnen. Dieses Papier versteht
sich zwar in erster Linie als ein theoretischer Beitrag, doch k¨ onnte es durchaus praktische
Konsequenzen haben.Contents
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Appendix 20Policy Instrument Choice and Non-Coordinated Monetary
Policy in Interdependent Economies1
1 Introduction
There is currently an active literature analysing a wide range of issues relating to mone-
tary policy in open economies. This has been prompted by the development of tractable
microfounded general equilibrium models of open economies where sticky prices give a
role for monetary policy. These models provide a natural basis for studying the welfare
implications of coordinated and non-coordinated monetary policy.2 In many respects this
new literature has developed a more or less common theoretical framework which includes
such features as real money balances in the utility function, imperfectly competitive goods
or labour markets, and sticky nominal prices or wages. There are however some diﬀer-
ences in approach between authors. One such diﬀerence is the way in which the monetary
policy instrument is speciﬁed. Some authors, such as Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998, 2002),
Devereux and Engel (2000) and Sutherland (2002b) adopt the traditional approach of
specifying monetary policy in terms of choices for the nominal money stock. But other
authors, such as Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b) and Clarida Gali and Gertler (2002) adopt
an alternative approach which is to specify monetary policy in terms of choices for the
nominal interest rate. An important question which, hitherto, has not been addressed in
the new literature is whether, and to what extent, it matters which instrument is used
to implement monetary policy. This is the focus of the current paper. Using a simple
model which is consistent with those used in the current literature we investigate the
circumstances in which the choice of monetary policy instrument aﬀects the equilibrium
outcome.
The appropriate choice of policy instrument has, of course, been the subject of an
1Authors’ aﬃliations: Giovanni Lombardo, Deutsche Bundesbank, Postfach 100602, D-60006 Frank-
furt am Main, Germany. Email: Giovanni.Lombardo@bundesbank.de; Alan Sutherland (corresponding
author): Department of Economics, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Fife, KY16 9AL, UK. Email:
ajs10@st-and.ac.uk Web: www.st-and.ac.uk/˜ajs10/home.html. We are grateful to an anonymous referee
for many useful comments. This research was supported by the ESRC Evolving Macroeconomy Programme
grant number L138251046 and by the Research Visitors Programme of the Deutsche Bundesbank. This
paper represents the authors’ personal opinions and does not necessarily reﬂect the views of the Deutsche
Bundesbank.
2The literature started with the deterministic analyses of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995) and Corsetti and
Pesenti (2001a) but has been extended to a stochastic framework in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998, 2002),
Devereux and Engel (2000), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000), Sutherland
(2002a, 2002b), Benigno and Benigno (2001) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002). These papers have
addressed such issues as the welfare gains from policy coordination, the relative welfare performance of ﬁxed
and ﬂexible exchange rate regimes, the implications of exchange rate pass-through and the implications of
ﬁnancial market integration. See Lane (2001) for a survey of this new literature. Clearly, many of the issues
listed above have been central questions in international macroeconomics for many years. For instance,
the analysis of international monetary policy coordination was the subject of an extensive earlier literature
(see for instance Hamada (1976), Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) and Oudiz and Sachs (1984)). The
distinguishing feature of the new literature (and therefore of this paper) is the emphasis on microeconomic
foundations and, in particular, the focus on welfare measures based on aggregate utility.
1extensive earlier literature starting with Poole (1970). The issue at stake in this previous
literature was the stabilising properties of a ﬁxed money supply target compared to a policy
of ﬁxing the nominal interest rate. Typically the conclusion from this earlier literature
was that the choice of instrument could have a substantial eﬀect on the volatility of macro
variables and that the ‘welfare’ ranking of instruments depended on the mixture of shocks
hitting the economy.
An important feature of the question addressed by this earlier literature, which dis-
tinguishes it from the issue we are investigating in this paper, is the focus on non-state-
contingent rules for the monetary policy instrument. Thus the earlier literature focused
on a policy of ﬁxing the quantity of money as compared to a policy of ﬁxing the nominal
interest rate. In this paper, on the other hand, we analyse monetary policy rules which
allow the monetary authority to react to shocks. Thus, in our framework (in common
with many of the contributions to the recent open economy literature) the monetary au-
thority chooses a feedback rule for the policy instrument which speciﬁes a reaction to the
exogenous shocks hitting the economy. The comparison to be made therefore is between
a feedback rule for the money supply and a feedback rule for the nominal interest rate.3
In this context one obvious reaction is to argue that, if the parameters of the rule
are chosen optimally by the monetary authority (as is typically the case in the recent
literature), it should not matter which policy instrument is determined by the rule. A
welfare maximising monetary authority is only concerned with the real equilibrium that
is delivered by the rule. If the policy instrument is the money supply then the monetary
authority will choose parameters for the feedback rule which deliver the desired real equi-
librium. Likewise if the policy instrument is the interest rate the monetary authority can
(and will) choose feedback parameters which deliver exactly the same desired real equi-
librium. Thus (in contrast to the literature following Poole (1970)) one may be tempted
to assume that the choice of policy instrument is irrelevant when the monetary authority
chooses a welfare maximising state-contingent rule.
We show in this paper that, although this logic may be correct in a closed economy
(where, by deﬁnition, there is only one monetary authority), it does not carry over to an
open economy setting. We show that, in general, when one is considering non-coordinated
policymaking represented by a Nash game between national policymakers, the real equi-
librium (and thus the level of welfare) delivered by the Nash equilibrium in the choice
of feedback parameters does depend on the particular way in which monetary policy is
speciﬁed. It is therefore not correct to assume that the choice of policy instrument is
irrelevant. There are however some special cases where the Nash equilibrium is unaﬀected
3In order for state-contingent rules to be feasible it is obviously necessary to assume that the shocks
are observable and (given the presence of rational foward-looking price setters) it is necessary to assume
that policymakers can credibly commit to their chosen rule. It is precisely because these assumptions
were felt to be unrealistic that, in the previous literature, so much attention was focused on analysing
non-state-contingent monetary rules. More recently, however, the greater independence of central banks
has (to some extent) reduced the perceived credibility problem attached to active monetary policy (even if
it hasn’t removed the problems relating to the observability of shocks). This has led to a renewed interest
in state-contingent rules for monetary policy. It is therefore important to re-examine the role of policy
instrument choice in a context where state-contingent rules are available.
2by the choice of policy instrument. These cases are identiﬁed and explained.4
Having shown that the real equilibrium delivered by the Nash game over the choice of
policy feedback parameters diﬀers depending on the choice of policy instrument, a natural
further question to analyse is the endogenous choice of the policy instrument itself. This
issue has already been addressed within the context of the earlier Poole-style analysis
by Turnovsky and d’Orey (1989). They consider a simple Nash game between national
policymakers in a two-country model where the policymakers make a choice between the
money supply or the nominal interest rate as the monetary policy instrument. In a similar
spirit we analyse an extension to our model where policymaking is a two-stage process.
In the ﬁrst stage there is a Nash game over the choice of policy instrument and in the
second stage there is a Nash game over the choice of parameters for feedback rules (which
determine the setting of the policy instruments chosen in the ﬁrst stage).5 We show that,
when the choice of policy instrument makes a diﬀerence to the equilibrium in the Nash
game over feedback parameters, there is a unique Nash equilibrium in the game over policy
instruments. The Nash equilibrium in the choice of policy instrument can either result
in the choice of money supply rules or interest rate rules depending on the elasticity of
money demand with respect to the nominal interest rate.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes a simple two-country model which
is used as a framework for analysing the implications of policy instrument choice. Section
3 analyses the comparison between interest rate rules and money supply rules. In this
section the choice of policy instrument is assumed to be exogenous. Section 4 considers
the endogenous choice of policy instrument. Section 5 discusses the implications of some
generalisation of our model. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The model has many of the features that have become standard in the recent open econ-
omy macro literature. One of the main aims of this recent literature has been to analyse
models based on consistent microeconomic foundations. But, within this general aim, an
important objective has been to develop simple structures which are, as far as possible,
tractable and easily solved. This implies, amongst other things, a tendency to focus on
explicit functional forms for utility and production functions. In particular a number of
authors have shown that certain choices of utility function can eliminate many trouble-
some features which would otherwise make progress very diﬃcult. We follow this general
modelling approach in this paper. We choose a model which is as simple as possible but
which is general enough to illustrate the central point at issue. It is also general enough to
4It must be emphasised that the type of interest rate rules analysed in this paper are rules which
explicitly make the nominal interest rate a function of the underlying exogenous shocks hitting the economy.
These rules are therefore not ”Taylor rules” (which make the nominal interest rate a function of endogenous
variables such as output and inﬂation).
5It is important to emphasise that in Turnovsky and d’Orey (1989), once the equilibrium choice of
policy instrument has been determined, the monetary authorities follow a non-state-contingent rule for
that instrument. This contrasts with our analysis, where the second-stage game results in state-contingent
rules which determine the setting of the policy instrument selected in the ﬁrst-stage game.
3encompass the models used in a number of important contributions to the recent literature.
There are two countries (which will be referred to as the home country and the foreign
country) and each country is populated by many inﬁnitely-lived agents. Each agent is a
monopoly producer of a single diﬀerentiated product and all agents set prices in advance
of the realisation of shocks and are contracted to meet demand at the pre-ﬁxed prices. The
assumption of pre-ﬁxed prices implies that monetary policy has some power to aﬀect real
variables, such as output and consumption. Pre-ﬁxed prices also imply that ex post, after
the realisation of shocks, the economy may not be in a welfare maximising equilibrium.
There is thus a welfare role for active monetary policy.
Agents derive utility from consuming a basket of all home and foreign goods. They
also derive utility from holding real money balances. This latter assumption ensures a
well deﬁned demand for money. The only input into production is the agent’s own work
eﬀort and the production function is assumed to be linear in work eﬀort. Agents derive
disutility from work eﬀort.
A number of authors (such as Devereux and Engel (2000), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b),
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000), Sutherland (2002a)) have recently shown that the
degree of exchange rate pass-through can have important implications for the welfare role
of monetary policy in open economies.6 In order to capture this feature of the recent
debate it is assumed that price contracts for the cross-border supply of goods specify a
degree of indexation to nominal exchange rate changes. This allows the degree of exchange
rate pass-through to be parameterised.
The detailed structure of the home country is described below. The foreign country
has an identical structure. Where appropriate, foreign real variables and foreign currency
prices are indicated with an asterisk.
2.1 Preferences
There is a continuum of agents of unit mass in each country. All agents in the home
economy have utility functions of the same form. Utility is assumed to be additively
separable across consumption of goods, holdings of real balances and work eﬀort. The
utility of home agent h is given by7















where C is a consumption index deﬁned across all home and foreign goods, M denotes end-
of-period nominal money holdings, P is the consumer price index, y (h) is the output of
good h, Et is the expectations operator conditional on information at time t. The discount
6The degree of exchange rate ‘pass-through’ is the extent to which a change in the nominal exchange
rate results in a change in the nominal prices charged to consumers for imported goods.
7Note that the structure of the production function implies that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between an agent’s work eﬀort and the amount of output produced by that agent. It is therefore possible
to express the disutility of work eﬀort directly in terms of output.
4factor is given by ¯ (where 0 < ¯ < 1). The parameter " (where " > 0) determines the
elasticity of demand for real balances.8
K is an i.i.d. random shock to labour supply preferences and Â is an i.i.d. random
shock to money demand preferences.9 Labour supply and money demand shocks are
distributed such that E[lnK] = E[lnÂ] = 0 and V ar[lnK] = ¾2
K and V ar[lnÂ] = ¾2
Â
























where Á > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between individual goods, cH (i) is consump-
tion of home good i and cF (j) is consumption of foreign good j.
The Cobb-Douglas form of (2) obviously implies a unit elasticity of substitution be-
tween home and foreign goods in consumption. This is a structure which has been adopted
by many authors in the recent open-economy literature (see for instance Obstfeld and Ro-
goﬀ (1998, 2002), Devereux and Engel (2000), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b), Bacchetta
and van Wincoop (2000), Sutherland (2002a, 2002b) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002))
because it implies that the current account is automatically in balance in all states of the
world.10 It is therefore not necessary to model international asset markets or to consider
asset stock dynamics. This considerably simpliﬁes the analysis of the model.11






















All the above prices are denominated in domestic currency.
8The assumption that utility is logarithmic in consumption and linear in work eﬀort are obviously quite
special. These assumptions are very useful in simplifying the solution of the model. The implications for
our results of more general functional forms are discussed in Section 5.
9The assumption of zero autocorrelation in the shocks has the advantage that it eliminates some irrel-
evant constant terms from the model solution without aﬀecting the important features of results.
10When there is less than full exchange rate pass-through this result only holds in the case where utility
is logarithmic in consumption. When there is full exchange rate pass-through the result also holds when
utility has a CRRA functional form for consumption. We discuss the implications of some more general
forms of utility function in Section 5.
11This assumption may however have an important impact on the welfare performance of non-coordinated
policymaking (as discussed in Sutherland (2002b)). The potential implications for the results reported in
this paper are discussed brieﬂy in Section 5.
52.2 Consumption Choices









where R is the gross return on a home currency riskless bond. A similar condition holds
for foreign agents where R¤ is the gross return on a foreign currency riskless bond.
The intratemporal dimension of the consumption choice problem gives rise to the
following individual home demands for home good i and foreign good j





























Foreign demands for home and foreign goods have an identical structure to the home
demands.
Each country has a population of unit mass and (in a symmetric equilibrium) all agents
within each country choose the same consumption bundle so the total demands for goods
are equivalent to individual demands. Thus for home agent h yH;t (h) = cH;t (h) and
y¤
H;t (h) = c¤
H;t (h) where c¤
H;t (h) is the foreign individual demand for home good h and
yH (h) and y¤
H (h) are sales of good h to home and foreign agents..









where P¤ is the aggregate consumer price index for foreign consumers and S is the nominal
exchange rate deﬁned as the domestic home currency price of foreign currency. This
relationship implies that complete international sharing of consumption risk is achieved
without the need to assume the presence of markets in state-contingent assets.
2.3 The Money Market













It is assumed that all changes in the money supply enter and leave the economy via
lump-sum transfers, so the government’s budget constraint is
Mt ¡ Mt¡1 + Tt = 0 (10)
where T are lump-sum transfers from home agents. The timing and structure of monetary
policy decisions are discussed in more detail below.
62.4 Price Setting and the Degree of Pass-Through
To allow for the possibility of incomplete exchange rate pass-through it is assumed that
producers enter into separate price contracts for sales in home and foreign markets. The
price contract signed by home agents for sales to foreign consumers is assumed to enforce
a ﬁxed degree of indexation to unanticipated exchange rate changes. Home agent h selling
to foreign consumers chooses a price ˘ pH(h) denominated in home currency. The actual
foreign currency price charged (denoted p¤
H (h)) is determined by the following formula










where SE is the ex ante expected exchange rate and 0 · ´ · 1. This structure allows a full
range of degrees of pass-through. ´ = 1 implies ‘producer currency pricing’ and full pass-
through. ´ = 0 implies ‘local currency pricing’ and zero pass-through.12 A relationship
similar to (11) enforces a ﬁxed degree of pass-through for foreign goods sold in the home
country. The degree of pass-through is assumed to be identical for both home and foreign
producers.
Individual agents are each monopoly producers of a single diﬀerentiated good. They
therefore set prices as a mark-up over marginal costs where the mark-up is given by
Φ = Á=(Á¡1): Prices in period t are set before period-t shocks are realised. Period-t prices
therefore depend on expectations of period t conditional on period-(t ¡ 1) information.
There are two ﬁrst-order conditions for the choice of prices for the home producer.13 One
for the price charged to home consumers as follows
PH;t = ΦEt¡1 [KtPtCt] (12)
And one for the price charged to foreign consumers as follows
P¤







The ﬁrst-order conditions for foreign price setting have a similar structure.
2.5 Policy Rules and Welfare
As described in Section 1, we assume that policy can be set in terms of a state-contingent
rule where the policymaker in each country is free to choose the parameters of the rule
12Implicitly the assumption of separate price contracts for home and foreign sales allows agents to price
discriminate between home and foreign markets. In a deterministic context there would be no incentive
to price discriminate because elasticities of demand are equal at home and abroad. But, in a stochastic
context, given the diﬀerent stochastic characteristics of home and foreign demand, price discrimination
in fact becomes optimal for ﬁxed-price agents. However, this incentive to price discriminate is incidental
to the analysis of this paper. The important point is that there are separate contracts. The structure of
contracts is taken to be a ﬁxed institutional feature of the economy. This structure follows, and is formally
identical to, the structure ﬁrst used by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b) to model incomplete pass-through.
13A detailed derivation of these ﬁrst-order conditions can be found in Sutherland (2002a).
7in an attempt to maximise welfare. Goods prices are pre-ﬁxed for only one period so
monetary policy in any given period can only aﬀect real outcomes in that period. It is
therefore suﬃcient to specify monetary policy in terms of feedback rules relating the policy
instrument to the shock variables. Thus money supply rules are of the following form
ˆ Mt = ±M;K²K;t + ±¤
M;K¤²K¤;t + ±M;Â²Â;t + ±M;Â¤²Â¤;t (14)
ˆ M¤
t = ±M¤;K²K;t + ±¤
M¤;K¤²K¤;t + ±M¤;Â²Â;t + ±M¤;Â¤²Â¤;t (15)
where a hat over a variable indicates a log deviation of that variable from a non-stochastic
steady state.
In the case of interest rate rules it is necessary to include an additional term in each
rule in order to ensure determinacy of the price level. This additional term must depend
on a nominal magnitude, such as P and P¤. Thus interest rate rules are of the following
form
ˆ Rt = ±R;K²K;t + ±¤
R;K¤²K¤;t + ±R;Â²Â;t + ±R;Â¤²Â¤;t + ±P ˆ Pt (16)
ˆ R¤
t = ±R¤;K²K;t + ±¤
R¤;K¤²K¤;t + ±R¤;Â²Â;t + ±R¤;Â¤²Â¤;t + ±P¤ ˆ P¤
t (17)
The coeﬃcients ±P and ±P¤ can be made arbitrarily small and thus have no substantive
impact on the behaviour of the model other than to ensure determinacy.
Policymakers choose the parameters of their policy rule for period t before period-
t prices have been set or shocks have been realised. Policymakers therefore make their
decisions based on the information available at the end of period t¡1. It is assumed that
policymakers can credibly commit to their choice of feedback parameters.
Because monetary policy in period t only aﬀects real outcomes in period t it is possible
to measure the welfare impact of period-t policy choices solely with reference to aggre-
gate expected ﬂow utility in period t. Following Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998, 2002) it is
assumed that the utility of real balances is small enough to be neglected. Therefore, at
the time period-t policy choices are made, aggregate expected ﬂow welfare of home agents
is measured using the following
Ωt = Et¡1 [logCt ¡ KtYt] (18)
where Y = CH + C¤
H is the total output of the home economy. Using (7), (11), (12) and
(13) it is possible to show that Et¡1 [KtYt] = 1=Φ thus welfare can be measured by





where, as above, a hat indicates a log deviation from a non-stochastic steady state and ˜ Ω
is the absolute deviation from welfare in the non-stochastic steady state.
3 Equilibrium Choice of Policy Rules with Policy Instru-
ments Speciﬁed Exogenously
In this section we assume that the choice of policy instrument is speciﬁed exogenously. We
compare the equilibrium that results when the policymakers in both countries use money
8supply rules with the case where the policymakers in both countries use interest rate rules.
The endogenous choice of policy instrument is considered in the next section. In this
section policymakers only make choices over the feedback parameters in the appropriate
policy rule.
The optimal coordinated choice of feedback parameters is considered ﬁrst. In this case
monetary policy is set by a single world monetary authority which chooses the feedback
parameters for both home and foreign monetary rules in order to maximise aggregate
world welfare, i.e. ˜ ΩW;t =
³
˜ Ωt + ˜ Ω¤
t
´
=2: The implications of money supply rules and
interest rate rules for non-coordinated policy14 are then described and some special cases
are identiﬁed and discussed. Some numerical solutions are also presented.
3.1 Optimal Coordinated Policy
The optimal coordinated coeﬃcients for the money supply and interest rate rules are
reported in Table 1. The ﬁrst and second moments of output and consumption for the
coordinated policy case are reported in Table 2.15















±M;Â = ±M¤;Â¤ 1=" ±R;Â = ±R¤;Â¤ 0
±M;Â¤ = ±M¤;Â 0 ±R;Â¤ = ±R¤;Â 0
Table 1: Coordinated policy - policy rule coeﬃcients
In the case of coordinated policymaking it is simple to see that the equilibrium outcome
is identical regardless of whether policy is set in terms of interest rate rules or money
supply rules. The crucial feature of coordinated policymaking which leads to this result
is the fact that there is a single world policymaker. This is a case, therefore, where the
closed-economy logic (described in the Section 1) also extends to an open economy setting.
The coordinated policymaker has control of monetary policy in both countries. For every
pair of state-contingent money supply rules which can be chosen there is a corresponding
pair of state-contingent nominal interest rate rules which yield the same equilibrium. The
coordinated policymaker can therefore specify policy in terms of the optimal pair of money
supply rules or the corresponding optimal pair of interest rate rules - both speciﬁcations of
policy will yield the same real equilibrium and the same level of aggregate world welfare.
3.2 Non-coordinated Policy
The case of non-coordinated policy is now considered. The Nash equilibrium coeﬃcients for
the money supply and interest rate rules are reported in Table 3 (where ∆ = (1¡¯)("¡1))
14Non-coordinated policy is deﬁned as the case where national monetary authorities act as Nash players
attempting to maximise national welfare.
15The variances of the i.i.d. innovations are set to unity.
9M and R rules



























Table 2: Coordinated policy - ﬁrst and second moments of output and consumption
and the implied ﬁrst and second moments of output and consumption are reported in Table
4.16















±M;Â = ±M¤;Â¤ 1=" ±R;Â = ±R¤;Â¤ 0
±M;Â¤ = ±M¤;Â 0 ±R;Â¤ = ±R¤;Â 0
Table 3: Nash equilibrium - policy rule coeﬃcients
M rules R rules










































Table 4: Nash equilibrium - ﬁrst and second moments of output and consumption
It is apparent from Table 4 that the Nash equilibrium yielded by money supply rules is
in general not identical to the Nash equilibrium yielded by interest rate rules. As argued
in Section 1, this may, at ﬁrst sight, seem to be a surprising result. Initial intuition
would suggest that the logic which applies to the coordinated policy case should, in a
modiﬁed form, also apply to the Nash policy case. So, for instance, one might be tempted
to argue that for each home-country money-supply rule there is a corresponding home-
country interest-rate rule which yields the same equilibrium for the home economy, so
optimal monetary policy for the home-country policymaker can equivalently be speciﬁed
16Again, the variances of the i.i.d. innovations are set to unity.
10in terms of a money-supply rule or an interest-rate rule (with the same being true for
foreign monetary policy).
So why then do the results in Table 4 indicate that the Nash equilibrium diﬀers de-
pending on the policy instrument? The answer is that the logic described in the previous
paragraph omits a crucial diﬀerence between the coordinated and Nash cases. In the co-
ordinated case the world policymaker is simultaneously choosing monetary policy for both
countries. But in the Nash case each policymaker is choosing policy for a single country.
Thus, when setting policy, the Nash policymaker in one country has to take account of
the way policy is set in the other country. And, crucially, a given change in monetary
policy in one country will have a diﬀerent impact on economic outcomes depending on
whether the other economy is following an interest-rate rule or a money-supply rule. Thus,
for instance, if the foreign economy is following a money-supply rule, an easing of home
monetary policy will aﬀect money demand in the foreign country and therefore aﬀect the
foreign interest rate. But if the foreign economy is following an interest-rate rule there will
be no impact on the foreign interest rate. In the ﬁrst case the change in the foreign interest
rate will either amplify or oﬀset the impact of the change in home monetary policy. This
amplifying or oﬀsetting eﬀect is not present in the case of a foreign interest rate rule.
To make this point more clearly it is useful to consider a simple deterministic policy
experiment. First notice that (after goods prices have been ﬁxed for period t) home and









Also notice that the home and foreign consumption Euler equations imply (after omitting
irrelevant constant terms)
ˆ Ct = ¡ ˆ Rt ¡ ˆ Pt ˆ C¤
t = ¡ ˆ R¤
t ¡ ˆ P¤
t (20)













If the foreign economy is following an interest rate rule then, in a deterministic experiment,
this implies ˆ R¤
t = 0. While a foreign money supply rule implies ˆ M¤
t = 0. The above ﬁve
equations (together with equation (8)) can be solved to yield the following expressions for
home and foreign consumption for the case of a foreign money supply rule ( ˆ M¤
t = 0)
ˆ Ct = ¡
2 ¡ ´ + ∆´
2 + ∆´





(where again ∆ = (1 ¡ ¯)(" ¡ 1)) and the following expressions for the case of a foreign
interest rate rule ( ˆ R¤
t = 0)
ˆ Ct = ¡
2 ¡ ´
2





11It is readily apparent from these expressions that the impact on consumption demand of
a given change in the home nominal interest rate diﬀers between the two cases. Thus the
optimal choice of home monetary policy (and therefore the Nash equilibrium) can diﬀer
depending on the rule followed by the foreign policymaker.17
3.3 Some Special Cases
The expressions in Table 4 and (22) and (23) show that, in general, non-coordinated money
supply rules can yield a diﬀerent equilibrium from non-coordinated interest rate rules. But
it is also clear that there are some special cases where the two types of rule produce the
same Nash equilibrium. It is easily seen from Table 4 and (22) and (23) that three such
special cases arise when " = 1 or ´ = 0 or ¯ = 1: Close inspection of the expressions in
Table 4 show that a further special case arises when ´ = 1.18
The reasons why these special cases arise can be understood by considering the example
illustrated by equations (20) to (23). This example showed how monetary policy in the
home country could have an impact on the interest rate in the foreign country when the
foreign country is following a money supply rule. It can be seen from (21) that this
mechanism operates through the presence of P¤ and C¤ in the foreign money market
expression. Home-country monetary policy only aﬀects the foreign interest rate when
home-country monetary policy aﬀects P¤ and C¤ and when these variables aﬀect foreign
money market equilibrium. The ﬁrst three special cases identiﬁed above are cases where
these connections are broken.
When " = 1 it can be seen from (20) and (21) that the direct eﬀect of any change in
P¤ on foreign money market equilibrium is precisely oﬀset by the eﬀect of P¤ on foreign
consumption operating through the consumption Euler equation. When ´ = 0 (i.e. when
the degree of exchange rate pass-through is zero) it can be seen from (20) that P¤ is
completely ﬁxed in the short run and hence C¤ depends only on the foreign nominal
interest rate. In both these cases home monetary policy has no eﬀect on foreign money
market equilibrium. In the ¯ = 1 case it can be seen from (21) that the interest elasticity
of money demand becomes inﬁnite so again the foreign nominal interest rate can not be
aﬀected by home monetary policy.
The forth special case (which arises when ´ = 1) has a more subtle explanation than
the other three. In this case equations (22) and (23) can be written as follows
ˆ Ct = ¡
1 + ∆
2 + ∆





17In this example home monetary policy is expressed in terms of the nominal interest rate. It is simple
to check that the logic is the same if home monetary policy is expressed in terms of the money supply.
18Two of these special cases (´ = 0 and ´ = 1) correspond to the cases of zero pass-through (or local
currency pricing) and full pass-through (or producer currency pricing). Devereux and Engel (2000), who
analyse a model very similar to the one used in this paper, focus on the extreme cases of full pass-through
and zero pass-through. They are therefore working with two of the special cases identiﬁed here. Corsetti
and Pesenti (2001b), who also analyse a model very similar to the one used here, allow for intermediate
degrees of pass-through but focus on the case where " = 1:(i.e. when utility is logarithmic in real balances).
They are thus also working with one of the special cases identiﬁed here.
12and
ˆ Ct = ¡
1
2





So, unlike the other three special cases just discussed, in this case the impact of a change
in the home interest rate on consumption demand diﬀers depending on the monetary rule
followed by the foreign country. But nevertheless the results in Table 4 show that the
Nash equilibrium is the same regardless of which type of rule is followed. This is because
(as shown by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2002)) when there is full pass-through there is in fact
no strategic interaction between the two economies so the Nash outcome is identical to the
coordinated outcome (as can be conﬁrmed by comparing the expressions shown in Tables
2 and 4). There can therefore be no diﬀerence between the two types of policy rule.
The absence of strategic interaction can be demonstrated very easily. When ´ equals
unity there is full pass-through and purchasing power parity holds. It therefore follows
from equation (8) that home and foreign consumption levels are equal, and thus, from
(19), it follows that home and foreign welfare levels are equal. Nash and coordinated
policymaking must therefore yield the same equilibrium.
It is immediately apparent from this argument, and from (24) and (25), that the
equivalence of interest rate rules and money supply rules in the ´ = 1 case will break
down when there is some degree of strategic interaction between policymakers. This will
be true, for instance, when there are non-traded goods (combined with preferences which
are non-logarithmic in consumption and non-linear in labour supply) or when the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods is not equal to unity. The ´ = 1 case
is therefore a more fragile special case than the other three special cases discussed above
(which do not depend on the absence of strategic interaction). We return to this point
below in Section 5.
3.4 Numerical Results
The quantitative implications for welfare of the above results are illustrated in Figure
1. This ﬁgure plots the diﬀerence between the level of world welfare in the two Nash
equilibria (with positive values indicating higher welfare with money supply rules).19 The
ﬁgure plots the welfare diﬀerence against values of ´ and for three values of ": Other
parameter values are ¯ = 0:95 and ¾2
²K = ¾2
²K¤ = 0:1 and »K = »K¤ = 0: Figure 1 shows
that the welfare diﬀerence between the two types of policy rules is never very large even
for quite extreme values of ": For instance the welfare gap at its widest is only -0.01
percent of steady state consumption. However, it is important to note that (as has been
emphasised in much of the recent literature) the welfare diﬀerence between coordinated
and non-coordinated policy is very small in a model of the form used here. In itself this
is likely to suggest that the welfare diﬀerence between diﬀerent forms of non-coordinated
policy are likely to be even smaller. Some recent contributions have analysed cases where
the welfare gains from coordination can be relatively large. For instance, Benigno and
19The welfare diﬀerence between equilibria is expressed in terms of the change in consumption (as a
percentage of consumption in a non-stochastic steady state) that would produce the equivalent change in
aggregate utility.
13Benigno (2001) and Sutherland (2002b) analyse the implications of allowing the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods to diﬀer from unity. In this case the
welfare diﬀerence between policy instruments is also likely to be much larger. In Section 5
we brieﬂy discuss the implications of allowing the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods to diﬀer from unity.20
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Figure 1: Welfare under the money supply rule minus welfare under the interest rate rule.
4 Endogenous Choice of Policy Instruments
In the previous section the choice of policy instrument is assumed to be exogenously given.
This section analyses the endogenous choice of policy instrument.
The setting of monetary policy now has two elements. The ﬁrst is the choice of policy
instrument - either the money supply or the nominal interest rate. The second is the
choice of parameters for feedback rules. It is convenient to think of these decisions being
made as part of a two-stage game where, in the ﬁrst stage, the policymaker in each country
20The welfare gains from coordination (and thus the welfare diﬀerence between policy instruments) may
also be larger when there is greater cross-country asymmetry in economic structures. Furthermore, as
emphasised by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), asymmetric shocks between traded and non-traded
sectors may increase the welfare gains from coordination.
14chooses a policy instrument and, in the second stage, feedback parameters are chosen. In
the ﬁrst-stage game each policymaker faces a binary choice over instruments (either the
money supply or the nominal interest rate). There are thus four possible outcomes from
the ﬁrst stage game. The four possible outcomes are summarised in Table 5.
Home country
M-rule R-rule
Foreign M-rule ˜ Ωt = ˜ Ω¤
t = W1 ˜ Ωt = W3; ˜ Ω¤
t = W2
country R-rule ˜ Ωt = W2; ˜ Ω¤


















Table 5: Welfare payoﬀs for game over policy instrument choice
The payoﬀs for each outcome from the ﬁrst-stage game are the equilibrium welfare
levels yielded by the relevant equilibrium in the second stage game. Thus, for instance,
when both countries choose to follow money-supply rules, the payoﬀ to each policymaker
is the welfare level yielded by a Nash equilibrium in the choice of feedback parameters
for money supply rules. Alternatively, when both countries choose to follow interest rate
rules, the payoﬀ to each policymaker is the welfare level yielded by a Nash equilibrium
in the choice of feedback parameters for interest rate rules. Each cell in Table 5 shows
the payoﬀs to the home and foreign policymakers for each of the four possible outcomes
from the ﬁrst stage game (including the payoﬀs which result when one country chooses to
follow a money supply rule and the other country chooses to follow an interest rate rule).
It is simple to check that the payoﬀs to all four outcomes are identical in any of the
four special cases discussed in the previous section. Thus if ´ = 0 or ´ = 1 or ¯ = 1 or
" = 1 the two policymakers are indiﬀerent about their choice of policy instrument and
therefore any one of the four outcomes to the ﬁrst stage game can be regarded as a Nash
equilibrium. The outcome of the general case, where 0 < ´ < 1; 0 < ¯ < 1 and " 6= 1 is
summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 When 0 < ´ < 1; 0 < ¯ < 1 and " < 1 there is a single Nash equilibrium
to the ﬁrst-stage game where both policymakers choose the money supply to be the policy
instrument. When 0 < ´ < 1; 0 < ¯ < 1 and " > 1 there is a single Nash equilibrium
to the ﬁrst-stage game where both policymakers choose the nominal interest rate to be the
policy instrument.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to show that each player has a dominant strategy in the two
cases. The choice of the money supply as the policy instrument is the dominant strategy for
15both policymakers when W1 > W3 and W2 > W4: Using the deﬁnitions for W1;W2;W3and
W4 it is simple to show that this is true when " < 1: The choice of the interest rate as
the policy instrument is the dominant strategy for both policymakers when W1 < W3 and
W2 < W4: It is simple to show that this is true when " > 1:
Proposition 1 shows that, provided " 6= 1; there is a unique Nash equilibrium to the
ﬁrst-stage game where both policymakers choose the same policy instrument.21 Notice
that the case where the choice of money supply rules is a Nash equilibrium to the ﬁrst
stage game (i.e. " < 1) corresponds to the case where money supply rules yield higher
world welfare in the second-stage game and the case where the choice of interest rate rules
is a Nash equilibrium to the ﬁrst stage game (i.e. " > 1) corresponds to the case where
interest rate rules yield higher world welfare in the second-stage game.
5 Robustness
In the previous sections we have discussed the instrument-choice problem under a set of
simplifying assumptions. In particular, we have assumed log preferences in consumption
and linear preferences in labour. Furthermore, we have assumed a unit elasticity of substi-
tution between home and foreign goods. In this section we brieﬂy discuss the implications
for our results of relaxing these assumptions.
CRRA preferences
At this point, it should be clear that the instrument-choice problem arises only when
there is strategic interdependence in monetary policy making and the policy makers do
not coordinate their decisions. Imposing a degree of relative risk aversion in consumption
diﬀerent from unity (i.e. adopting a general CRRA functional form) does not eliminate
strategic interdependence, nor does the assumption of non-linear preferences in labour
supply.22 The special cases discussed in Section 3.3 also continue to apply with this more
general structure of preferences. The results derived in Section 3 are therefore robust to
generalisations of this type.
Nevertheless, one might wonder whether the ﬁrst-stage game (the choice of instru-
ments) still yields the same unique Nash equilibrium. Direct calculation of the payoﬀ
functions under general CRRA preferences shows that the ordering of the payoﬀs changes
only in a very special way (Cf Table 5). For certain combinations of values of the con-
sumption and labour risk-aversion coeﬃcients only the pairs (W1;W2) and (W3;W4) cross
more than once (at " = 1 and at " > 1). This implies that Proposition 1 still holds under
general CRRA preferences in consumption and labour.
21The symmetry of the Nash equilibrium in the choice of policy instrument is likely to be a consequence
of the symmetric structure of the model. In an asymmetric world Nash equilibria may exist where the two
countries choose diﬀerent policy instruments.
22With a degree of relative risk aversion diﬀerent from one the consumption risk-sharing condition does
not hold automatically. In this case we follow Devereux and Engel (2000) by assuming the existence of a
full set of contingent assets that household can purchase in both countries so to insure themselves against
consumption risk.
16Full exchange-rate pass-through
Turnovsky and d’Orey (1989) discuss the instrument-choice problem in a setting where
the “law of one price” (and purchasing power parity - PPP) holds. In contrast, we have
seen in our model that under PPP (i.e. the case where there is full exchange rate pass-
through, ´ = 1), there is no strategic interdependence in monetary policy and, hence, the
instrument-choice problem ceases to exists. Strategic interdependence does arise, however,
in the PPP case in a more general version of our model where the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and imported goods is greater than unity.23 For reasons of space we
do not develop this model here. We simply report the implications of such a model.24
The more general model shows that, even in the full pass-through case, the equilibrium
allocations diﬀer between money supply rules and interest rate rules when the elasticity of
substitution between home and foreign goods is greater than unity (and also " and ¯ are
not equal to unity). Furthermore, the payoﬀ functions for the ﬁrst-stage game cross (more
than once) only in pairs (i.e. (W1;W2) and (W3;W4)) leaving the Nash equilibrium in the
choice of policy instrument unchanged. Therefore, we can claim that Proposition 1 can be
generalized to the full-pass-through case when the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods is greater than unity.
An important feature of this more general model is that (as shown in Sutherland
(2002b)) the welfare gains from policy coordination are potentially much higher when
the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is greater than unity. The
welfare diﬀerences between the equilibria for the money supply rules and interest rate rules
are thus also potentially much larger in this case.
6 Conclusion
This paper has compared state-contingent money supply rules with state-contingent inter-
est rate rules in a two-country sticky-price general equilibrium model. It has been shown
that, in general, the equilibrium outcome of non-coordinated policymaking can diﬀer de-
pending on whether monetary policy is speciﬁed in terms of money supply rules or interest
rate rules. A number of special cases are identiﬁed where the two types of rule yield the
same equilibrium. The endogenous choice of policy instrument was analysed as part of
a two-stage game and it was shown that a unique Nash equilibrium exists in the choice
of monetary instrument. This paper has concentrated on deriving explicit results for a
fairly restrictive model (which is nevertheless representative of the recent literature). The
results are, however, robust to a number of important generalisations of the model.
23Turnovsky and d’Orey (1989) use a Lucas-supply function to describe output. They assume that the
elasticity of output with respect to the relative price can diﬀer from unity.
24Sutherland (2002b) uses a model of this form to analyse the welfare gains from policy coordination.
Sutherland does not, however, analyse the instrument-choice problem.
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The model is closed with the addition of the appropriate set of policy rules. All the
equations of the model are linear in logs with the exception of the money-market equations
(A6) and the aggregate output equations (A9). These equations can be replaced by second
order approximations and the model can be solved on the assumption that all the variables
of the model are approximately log-normal.
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